



WE FUEL AMAZING

Annular pressure management

OISD Well Integrity Workshop, 25th and 26th November 2013





Agenda

- Current international standards followed
 - Sources of annulus pressure
 - Barrier philosophy and causes of sustained annulus pressure
 - Annulus pressure management philosophy
 - Calculation of maximum and minimum operating pressures
 - Examples of Well Integrity dashboards
 - Challenges to Annulus pressure management
 - Conclusions
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International standards followed governing management of annulus pressure



- Well integrity – Part 2: Well integrity for the operational phase ISO/TS16530-2
 - Annular Casing Pressure Management for Offshore Wells - API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 90
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Sources of annulus pressure

- Applied pressure
 - Thermal induced pressures
 - Thermal expansion of fluid
 - Dissolved gas evolution from annulus fluid
 - Ballooning of adjacent annuli
 - Sustained annulus pressure
 - Barrier failure
 - Poor design
 - Unforeseen source of pressure
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Barrier Philosophy


- Capable of sustained flow? - Two **independently** tested well barrier envelopes should be maintained.
- Well barriers are pressure containing envelopes of one or several Well Barrier Elements (WBE).
- The **primary** barrier is the barrier exposed to the source, source being formation, lift gas, injection.
- The **secondary** barrier is the barrier that is exposed to the source only if the primary barrier fails
- Two well barriers are **independent** if any loss of integrity of one well barrier does not jeopardize the integrity of the other

*Source : Well integrity – Part 2: Well integrity for the operational phase
ISO/TS16530-2*



Sustained annulus pressure - causes

- Tubular leaks
- Hanger seal failure
- Loss of cement integrity
- Loss of formation integrity
- Loss of packer / seal integrity
- Leaking control line
- Subsea Crossover valves leaking
- Shallow pressure source







How to define the Operating envelope

- Draft ISO standard is not prescriptive whilst API RP90 is
 - ISO defines Maximum Allowable Annular Surface Pressure (MAASP) as the lowest of the calculated strength cases
 - Operator decides Max operating pressure (MOP) as % of MAASP
 - ISO gives guideline that MOP should not exceed 80% MAASP
 - API RP90 does not recognise MAASP - instead talks about Max allowable operating pressure (MAWOP)
 - API RP 90 defines annulus MAWOP as:
 - 50% of the MIYP of the casing being evaluated or
 - 80% of the MIYP of the next outer casing
 - 75% of the MCP of the inner tubular pipe body
 - For the outer most pressure containing casing MAWOP can not exceed 30% of it's MIYP
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Annulus pressure management

- Calculate maximum allowable annulus pressure (MAASP)
- Determine minimum operating pressure
 - observation pressure - avoiding vapour phase generation (corrosion acceleration) - preventing air ingress



Annulus pressure monitoring procedures



- Monitoring and trending of pressures
 - Recording of fluid types / volumes added / removed
 - Establish frequency and type of monitoring
 - Periodic testing of well barriers
 - Operational changes to the well or other wells / surroundings
 - Calibration and function checks of the monitoring equipment
 - Periodic review of well stock
 - Third party audit of the WIMS
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


Acceptable Pressure / Leak Rate Determination

- Wells with <100 psig annulus pressure should be monitored only.
 - Wells with >100 psig but $<$ MAWOP if they can be bled to zero within 24hr presents an acceptable risk
 - Wells with annulus pressure above MAWOP or where the pressure cant be bled off must be dealt with on a case by case basis.
 - How to deal with “rogue” wells is left to the operator - it is not prescribed in API RP 90 or Norsok standard.
 - Each country will have its own jurisdiction on how rogue wells must be reported
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
Automated pressure bleed off system



AUTOMATED PRESSURE BLEED OFF SYSTEM



WIMS dashboard example 1





WIMS dashboard example 2

Logged in as: Integrity Manager. Area Location Well B5 SafeWells

SafeWells

Location Bangora

Well B5

- Detail
- Documents
- Information (A)
- Parts Inventory (A)
- Subsurface Design (A)
- Schedule Activity (A)

B5 Risk Status Medium Concern Well Schematic Open

Conductor Cement 30" 8081 X-58
Gartector
Surface Casing Cement 13 1/4" 2335N N-30
Intermediate
Safety Valve
Tubing to 9619t

Well Pressures

psi

3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0

08-Apr-10 15-Aug-10 22-Aug-10 29-Aug-10 05-Sep-10 12-Sep-10 19-Sep-10 26-Sep-10 03-Oct-10 10-Oct-10 17-Oct-10 24-Oct-10 31-Oct-10 07-Nov-10 14-Nov-10 21-Nov-10 28-Nov-10 05-Dec-10 12-Dec-10 19-Dec-10 26-Dec-10 02-Jan-11 09-Jan-11 16-Jan-11 23-Jan-11 30-Jan-11 06-Feb-11

— A
— B
— THP
- - - MAWOP
- - - MAWOP

B5 Outstanding Actions

- Issue with Swab Valve:
Highlighted by Xmas Tree Integrity Test on 19-Apr-10
(Resolution not yet entered) Risk Assessment Required
- Issue with Safety Valve:
Highlighted by SSSV Leak Test on 19-Apr-10
(Resolution not yet entered) SCF_{IN} (i.e. 15 SCF/min)


Create New... Select All Close Selection Show Closed Actions

B5 Activity History Filter: Show All Activities

- 14-Nov-10 Xmas Tree Function Test
- 12-May-10 Wellhead Seals and Annulus Valve Testing

Are leaks simple?

- No!
- One-way leaks exist.
- Leak paths can allow gas to pass but not liquids.
- Annular debris can act as a check valve.
- If the leak is below liquid level, gas will bubble up through the liquid but liquid will be trapped.





What if there is lack of access to annulus?

- This occurs in subsea wellheads
 - Leave the shoe open to allow for bleed off
 - This is not assured - see previous slide
 - Rupture disks to provide leak points in the casing
 - Nitrogen foamed spacers to provide a gas cap
 - Include compressible beads in the annular fluid
 - Collapsible foam wrap on casing - controlled collapse
 - Vacuum insulated tubing (reduce heat transfer)
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Threats to well integrity - SCE assurance



- Good design
 - Knowledge of the material of construction and QA/QC of assembly
 - Proper storage
 - Correct installation
 - Functional testing
 - Pressure testing (one part of a bigger picture)
 - Life cycle maintenance and verification

 - Relying only on pressure testing (or missing any part of the assurance process) can be dangerous
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Threats to well integrity - Material degradation & loss of functionality

- Corrosion (well fluids)
 - Sweet
 - Sour
 - Oxygen
 - Cathodic
- External casing corrosion
- Erosion / Casing wear
- Sand production
- Elastomer degradation
- Fatigue and tubing & casing stress (pressure, thermal, tectonic)
- Scale formation (e.g. BaSO_4 , CaCO_3)
- Hydrate formation





Cement life cycle assurance

- Reliance on consistent mixing and QA/QC
- Possibility of lost returns
- Poor remediation effectiveness
- Thermal cycling during wells life
- Inability to monitor condition of cement



Key to successful Well Integrity Management



- Organisational Competency
 - Develop proactive rather than reactive well integrity management
 - Designing for the Life Cycle - Embedding well integrity in the equipment design
 - Solid well construction practices and well life cycle management
 - Management commitment
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Thanks
